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THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
OF 1980: CURBING UNRESTRICTED
THIRD-PARTY SEARCHES IN THE
WAKE OF ZURCHER V. STANFORD
DAILY

Journalists historically have been the victims of abusive government search and seizure. 1 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
"(t]he use by government of the power of search and seizure as
an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable publications is nothing new." 2 Modern American journalists, however, had largely forgotten this historical experience until the
Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 8 That
decision, upholding the constitutionality of newsroom searches,
once again raised the specter of policemen barging into newsrooms to search for journalists' materials.• To assuage these
' For more than 200 years after the practice was instituted in the 1500's, English
monarchs used the state's search and seizure power to harass journalists and suppress
objectionable publications. The practice finally ceased after Lord Camden in Entick v.
Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765), declared it illegal. See generally N. LAssoN,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 23-51 (1937); F. SIEBERT, FftEEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND (1952).
• Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961). The Supreme Court also has
recognized that "[t]he Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge
that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling
liberty of expression." Id. at 729. See also Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65
(1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886).
• 436 U.S. 547 (1978). For a discussion of the Zurcher holding, see pt. I A infra. As far
as commentators have been able to determine, the newsroom search in Zurcher was unprecedented. See Citizen Privacy Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1978) (prepared statement of Philip Heymann, Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
' Perhaps the best illustration of the vision Zurcher conjured in journalistic minds is
the statement of Howard K. Smith of ABC News:
When I was a new young reporter at the United Press in Berlin ... there was a
knock on the door . . . and 15 Gestapo men barged past me, began opening
every desk and studying every piece of paper they could find. Six hours later,
they left. I remember thanking God this couldn't happen in America. Well, now
it can. [Zurcher] is the worst, most dangerous ruling the Court has made in
memory.
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 147-48 (appendix to testimony of the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press). Editorial reaction to Zurcher from other journalists
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fears, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (the
"Act"):1
Congress, however, did not go far enough. The Act protects
primarily the press and others engaged in disseminating information to the public. 6 Yet Zurcher permits the police to search
persons suspected of possessing criminal evidence whether or
not they are engaged in informing the public. 7 All persons - not
just journalists - are now subject to unnannounced police
searches. 8 By limiting the Act's protections primarily to the
press, Congress has failed to remedy Zurcher's impact on the
privacy rights of the general public. 8 This failure to protect all
third parties adequately from unrestrained police searches is a
major shortcoming of the congressional response to Zurcher.
This article analyzes the Privacy Protection Act as a response
to Zurcher. Part I discusses the Zurcher.decision and its effect
on First and Fourth Amendment rights, as well as its impact on
state testimonial privileges. Part II critically examines key features of the statute, focusing on the parties and materials protected, the police practices regulated, the remedies provided for
violations, and the Act's constitutional underpinnings. Part II
also offers suggestions for remedying the problems the Act currently presents. The article concludes that the Privacy Protection Act, while a necessary first step to minimizing the impact of
Zurcher, is inadequate to address all the issues raised by unwas equally vituperative. See generally Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 158-60 (1979) (appendix D to testimony of
the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
• Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Protection Act].
• See id. § 101.
• See pt. I A infra.
• It should be remembered that historically journalists were not the only ones who
suffered as a result of abusive government search and seizure. For example, in the American colonies, the most oppressive instrument of state search and seizure power - the
writs of assistance - were directed primarily at colonial merchants suspected of smuggling goods to avoid customs duties. See generally Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 36466 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
• Congress has elsewhere shown a continuing concern for safeguarding the privacy
rights of American citizens. See, e.g., the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 3401 (Supp. II 1978) (protecting customers of financial institutions from unwarranted
intrusions into their financial records); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976) (protecting the personal privacy of individuals from invasion by federal agencies).
In addition, the Carter Administration sent several proposals to Congress for greater
protection of personal privacy because of the potential threat posed by modem technology. See Hucker, Carter Sends Congress Sweeping Plan To Protect Individual Privacy
Rights, 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 641 (1979).
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restricted third-party searches.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Zurcher Decision

Zurcher was the first case in the federal courts to decide
whether the police can search non-suspects using a warrant
rather than a subpoena duces tecum. 10 The case arose when Palo
Alto police obtained a warrant to search the Stanford Daily,
Stanford University's student newspaper, for photographs of a
campus demonstration. 11 The newspaper sued the police after
the search, claiming that the search violated its First and Fourth
Amendment rights because the police did not resort to a subpoena to obtain the desired evidence. 12 The federal district court
agreed, and adopted a "subpoena first" rule for seaching nonsuspects: police must use subpoenas duces tecum rather than
warrants to search non-suspects unless the police can show that
a subpoena would be "impractical."18 The court said that absent
a showing of impracticality, searching non-suspects by means of
a warrant is a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment. 14 In
addition, the court said that where the police plan to search a
newsroom, the First Amendment requires an especially high
showing of impracticality. 111 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 18
1

Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 127-28 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
The police sought photographs taken by Daily staffers of a demonstration at the
university's hospital at which demonstrators attacked several policemen. The Daily was
a non-suspect; it was neither implicated in the demonstrations nor suspected of any
criminal activity. The search, described by the district court as "quite thorough," lasted
about 15 minutes. Police searched filing cabinets, baskets and desk drawers. According to
plaintiff's affidavits, the "officers were in a position to see notes taken by reporters in the
course of interviews which contained information given in confidence and on the understanding that the name of the source would not be disclosed." Only photographs and film
already published were recovered. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 550-51.
11
Id. at 552.
1
• The district court held that the police cannot obtain a warrant to search for materials held by a non-suspect unlesa the magistrate issuing the warrant has probable cause,
supported by sworn affidavits, that the materials sought would be destroyed or removed.
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. at 127.
14
Id.
10
The district court held that where a newsroom is to be searched, the First Amendment requires a clear showing that (1) important materials will be destroyed or removed
from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile. Id. at 135.
1
• Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
•

11
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. 17 The Court held
that the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment18 - on
which the District Court relied for its "subpoena first" rule does not require the police to resort to a subpoena when searching non-suspects. 19 The Court rejected the district court's conclusion that it is per se unreasonable to employ a warrant when
a subpoena could have been used. In effect, the Court said that
the existence of probable cause automatically establishes the
reasonableness of issuing the warrant, regardless of whether or not the party being searched is a suspect. ao The majority noted
that probable cause is all that traditionally was required for issuance of a valid warrant;11 probable cause, in turn, only requires a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is located at
the place to be searched. The criminal culpability of the property owner is irrelevant to the initial determination whether or
not to issue a warrant. 19 Therefore, said the Court, a warrant
may issue to search both suspects and non-suspects as long as
probable cause is established. 118 The Court rejected any consideration of the privacy rights of non-suspects in determining
whether a warrant should issue because it said "[t]he Fourth
Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and
436 U.S. at 553.
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against "unreasonable
searches and seizures." See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure
. . . against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . . ). Commentators disagree on the relationship
of this clause to the warrants clause which follows it. Three theories exist. The first is
that the reasonableness of a search is determined solely by the existence of a warrant
that satisfies the requirements of probable cause and specificity contained in the warrants clause. A second theory suggests that even if all the requirements of the warrant
clause are met, a search pursuant to a warrant still may be unreasonable on independent
grounds. The third theory holds that the requirements of the warrants clause only apply
to warranted searches and that the reasonableness clause provides an additional search
power for warrantless searches. See Comment, Third Party Searches in the Face of
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Toward a Set of Reasonableness Requirements, 11 CONN. L.
1
1

•
•

REv. 660, 661-62 (1979).

" Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 560.
The Court said that "valid warrants . . • may be issued when it is satisfactorily
demonstrated . . . that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the
premises." Id. at 559. See also note 23 infra.
11
436 U.S. at 554.
•• Id. at 554-56. The Court noted that "search warrants are not directed at persons;
they authorize the search of 'place[s]' and the seizure of 'things,' and as a constitutional
matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized." Id. at
00

555.
11
The Court pointed out that "The critical element in a reasonable search is not that
the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the property
to which entry is sought." Id. at 556.
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public need."14 Once probable cause is established, said the
Court, privacy rights must yield to the "fundamental public
interest" in law enforcement. H
The Court also noted that a "subpoena first" rule would entail
"hazards to criminal investigation much more serious than the
District Court believed.,,.. First, the alleged non-suspect actually
may be involved in the crime under investigation; H the party to
be searched is culpable, using a subpoena would warn him of the
impending search, permitting him to dispose of the evidence
sought. Second, even if the party to be searched is not culpable,
he might be sympathetic to the actual criminal and notify him
of the search. Third, the real culprits may have access to the
premises where the evidence is located and can use the delay
involved in securing evidence by subpoena to destroy the materials sought.17 In addition, because subpoenas are easier to obtain
initially, the Court was skeptical of the contention that subpoenas provide significantly more privacy protection than a
warrant. 18
Turning to the free speech challenge, the Court also dismissed
the argument that the First Amendment requires a "subpoena
first" rule for newsroom searches. The Court said nothing in the
Fourth Amendment exempts the press from police searches as
long as probable cause is established.19 Although it acknowledged that warrant requirements must be observed with "particular exactitude"80 when First Amendment interests are involved,
the Court said that "no more than this is required."81 Normal
Fourth Amendment requirements - probable cause, specificity,
and overall reasonableness - are, as the Court pointed out, sufficient to protect the press from abusive police searches.81 The
Court also remained unconvinced that newsroom searches would
affect adversely the ability of journalists to gather news from
confidential sources. 88
14
Id.
.. Id.
"Id.
.., Id .
.. Id.
"Id.
00
Id.

at 559.
at 554.
at 561.

at 562-63.
at 565.
See Stanford v. Teus, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
11
436 U.S. at 565.
.., Id .
.., Id. at 566. The Court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), where it had
rejected similar claims by the presa in holding that journalists could be compelled to
reply to grand juey subpoenas even though thia might threaten confidential sources. For
a diecusaion of journalists' confidential sources, see notes 58-59 and accompanying text
infra.
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The Impact of Zurcher: Subpoena v. Warrant

Zurcher dramatically expanded the permissible scope of unannounced police searches. 34 In rejecting the district court's
"subpoena first" rule, the Court said that the Fourth Amendment does not provide any greater protection for persons not
suspected of criminal activity ,8 11 and thus placed both suspects
and non-suspects on an· equal footing with respect to police
searches. The Court also rejected the notion that the First
Amendment requires greater safeguards when a newsroom is the
object of a third-party search.
Reaction to Zurcher was swift and critical, both by legal commentators38 and by Congress. 37 The criticism was directed primarily at the Court's failure to recognize that although a subpoena duces tecum is not as effective an investigatory tool as the
warrant, it is far more protective of individual privacy because it
provides notice and an opportunity to object, and because it is
less intrusive. 38 Because of this failure, critics pointed out that
04
This expansion was made possible by the Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), abandoning the so-called "mere evidence" rule. Before 1967, the
Court distinguished between merely evidentiary materials, which could not be searched
for by warrant even if poBSeBBed by a BU8pect, and contraband or the fruits and instrumentalities of crime, which could be seized by warrant. See Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). It was only after the Court
abandoned this distinction in Warden that third party searches for evidentiary materials
became an iBBue. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 577-80 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
86 In fact, the Court noted that until recently, the Fourth Amendment was thought to
be "more protective where the place to be searched was occupied by one suspected of
crime . . . ." 436 U.S. at 555.
86 See generally Cantrell, Zurcher: Third Party Searches and Freedom of the Press,
62 MARQ. L. REv. 35 (1978); Note, Search and Seizure in the Newsroom-Constitutional
Implications for the First and Fourth Amendments-Zurcher v. The Standard Daily, 28
DEPAUL L. REV. 123 (1978); Note, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Newsroom Searches Held
Valid, 15 IDAHO L. REv. 167 (1978); 9 CuM. L. REv. 869 (1979); 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 150
(1979); 1979 Wis. L. REv. 660. But see Note, Search Wa"ants and the Press: Zurcher v.
The Stanford Daily, 8 CAP. U.L. REv. 595 (1979) .
.., In CongreBB, the first Zurcher bill was proposed in the House on June 2, 1978, only
two days after the Supreme Court decided Zurcher. See H.R. 12952, 95th Cong., 2d Sees.
(1978). The first Senate bill was proposed on June 5, 1978. See S. 3164, 95th Cong., 2d
Sees. (1978). Sixteen bills eventually were introduced in the 96th CongreBS alone. In the
Senate, four bills were filed: S. 115, S. 855, S. 1790 and S. 1816; on the House side,
Representatives introduced a dozen Zurcher bills: H.R. 283, H.R. 322, H.R. 368, H.R.
380, H.R. 1293, H.R. 1305, H.R. 1373, H.R. 1437, H.R. 3486, H.R. 3781, H.R. 3837 and
H.R. 4181. S. 1790, as amended, eventually became the Privacy Protection Act.
18
The chief advantage of the warrant over the subpoena as an investigatory tool is
that the warrant allows the police to act quickly without notice to the person whose
property is to be searched. The lack of notice minimizes the risk of removal or destruction of the evidence sought before the police can seize it. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41;
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the Court did not adequately consider the adverse consequences
of unrestricted third-party searches. In particular, critics decried
the decision because of its anticipated impact on (1) the privacy
rights of non-suspects, (2) freedom of the press to gather and
disseminate news, and (3) state testimonial privileges for attorneys and other professionals.
1. Zurcher and the right to privacy- Zurcher·critics believe
that search warrants pose dangers to individual privacy rights
which subpoenas do not, and that subpoenas therefore should be
preferred unless compelling law enforcement considerations outweigh the privacy interests involved. 39 In Zurcher, however, the
Supreme Court minimized the dangers to privacy posed by
third-party searches. The Court said that because of the requirements of probable cause and specificity,•0 and because of the involvement of neutral magistrates,n warrant procedure provides
safeguards adequate to insure that police searches do not unnecessarily infringe on privacy rights.
Theoretically, of course, warrant procedures are designed to
protect privacy rights adequately. But these safeguards, however, are illusory. In many jurisdictions, for example, the "detached and neutral magistrate" required to issue a warrant does
not have to be a lawyer. 41 This lack of legal training is significant
because nonlawyers are less able than lawyers to apply the highsee also Note, Newsroom Searches Held Valid, supra note 36, at 177; Note, Search and
Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis,
28 STAN. L. REv. 957,992 (1976); 13 SuwoLK U.L. REv. 150, 153 n.22 (1979): By contrast,
however, a subpoena is more protective of privacy rights. Subpoena procedure provides a
mechanism for pre-seizure objection which provides notice to the party possessing the
desired evidence. In addition, the subpoena is less intrusive because it does not permit
the police to enter property to search for the evidence sought; instead, a subpoena only
directs the person to whom it is issued to produce certain evidence before the issuing
court at a specified time and place. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). See also Note,
Newsroom Searches Held Valid, supra note 36, at 174-78; 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 150, 153
n.22 (1979).
19
See, e.g., Note, Newsroom Searches Held Valid, supra note 36, at i74-78.
•• The Fourth Amendment specifically states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
" The Supreme Court has said that only "detached and neutral magistrates" may
issue warrants. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Chapman v. United States,
356 U.S. 610 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Searches conducted
"outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967). This requirement of prior judicial approval is subject only to a few "jealously and
carefully drawn" except\ons. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). For a discussion of some of these exceptions, see note 124 and accompanying text infra .
•• Y. KAMlsAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 (4th ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Y. KAMlsAR et. al.].
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ly technical requirements of probable cause and specificity. Even
magistrates with legal training fail to scrutinize adequately the
evidence presented by the police in determining whether probable cause to search exists. 48 As a result, they often abdicate this
responsibility to the police or prosecutors.•• In addition, the police often are under pressure to falsify or at least color facts to
establish probable cause.n These problems undermine two key
safeguards - a neutral magistrate and probable cause - on
which the Zurcher majority relied.
Even if the police scrupulously follow warrant procedures, the
search warrant still involves a greater invasion of privacy than
the subpoena. For one, the police must physically intrude onto
the property being searched to execute the warrant. 46 This subjects the property owner to the embarrassment of a police search
even though he may not be a suspect. 47 In addition, the warrant
•• See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30
Mo. L. REV. 391 (1965); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role
in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987 (1965).
Both articles conclude that magistrates often grant police requests for warrants without
an adequate inquiry into the grounds for issuance of the warrant.
" See Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision, 1964 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1 (1964). Examining local practices in Kansas, Michigan and Wisconsin, the authors found that in all three states the prosecutor alone made the decision to issue a
warrant despite statutes in each state providing for varying degrees of judicial intervention. The authors concluded that warrants are issued perfunctorily with "virtually no
judicial inquiry into the existence of probable cause." Id. at 6. The performance of magistrates under the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), illustrates the degree to which magistrates honor police requests for warrants. Between 1969
and 1976, magistrates denied only 15 of 5,563 police requests for warrants under the Act.
In 1977, magistrates approved all 626 applications for warrants. See TwENTY-SEVENTH
REPORT BY THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS: SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE
EFFECTS OF THE STANFORD DAILY DECISION, H.R. REP. No. 1521, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7
(1978).
•• These pressures exist because of the importance of a good arrest and conviction
record, and because of the difficulty of achieving such a record after the exclusionary rule
was extended to the states by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Chevigny, Police
Abuses in Connection With the Law of Search and Seizure, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (1969);
Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 NATION 596 (1967); Comment, Police Perjury in
Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
Police perjury is facilitated because the affidavits submitted by the police to show
probable cause can be based on hearsay evidence. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960). If these affidavits are valid on their face, a defendant attacking the accuracy of
the information on which the police relied to establish probable cause must make a substantial showing that the false statement contained in the affidavits was knowingly or
intentionally made before he is entitled to a hearing on the matter. Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154 (1978).
•• See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. See also L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG,
DETECTION OF CRIME 99-120 (1967).
n In his Zurcher dissent, Justice Stevens noted that: "The dramatic character of a
sudden search may cause an entirely unjustified injury to the reputation of the person
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permits the police to "rummage" through personal effects not
even named in the warrant. Even though the police may search
only where the items described in the warrant reasonably could
be concealed,48 many items of highly personal nature may be revealed unavoi~ably in the course of the necessary search.49 Finally, the warrant provides no possibility of pre-seizure objection.110 The party being searched has no opportunity to convince
a judge or magistrate that the search is unnecessary or that it
should be limited in some way.
The subpoena, of course, results in none of these hazards. The
police never enter the property being searched, so no late night
search of an innocent person with all the attendant embarassment and disruption would occur. In addition, no rummaging
takes place because the desired evidence is delivered to the court
by the party in possession rather than by the police. Finally, the
party being searched may contest the necessity for or scope of a
subpoena, before the search takes place, thus insuring that the
invasion of privacy occasioned by the need for criminal evidence
is minimized. 111 Therefore, the subpoena is more protective of
privacy rights than the warrant.
The subpoena, however, is not without disadvantages. The
Zurcher majority stressed that the subpoena entails "hazards to
law enforcement,"111 making it an unsuitable substitute for the
warrant as an investigatory device. First, the subpoena is not
available to the police or prosecutors as an investigatory tool in
most jurisdictions. 118 A "subpoena first" rule in those jurisdicsearched." 436 U.S. at 580. See also Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme
Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. RBv. 664, 701 (1961).
The adverse effect of police searches on reputation is especially acute in those jurisdictions that permit nighttime searches. Although most states require the police to execute
warrants during the day, 14 jurisdictions authorize searches at any time. See MoDRI.
CODE OF PR!:-AmwGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 220.2 Commentary (Official Draft No. 1 1972).
•• See Y. KAMISAR, et. al., supra note 42, at 264.
•• See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 573 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting):
[I]n order to find a particular document, no matter how specifically it is identified in the warrant, the police will have to search every place where it might
be-including, presumably, every file in the office-and to examine each document they find to see if it is the correct one.
00
The party being searched is notified only after the police have arrived to search the
premises. The party can object to the search only after it has been executed. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)-(f).
•• See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
" 436 U.S. at 561.
" While several jurisdictions grant prosecutors the power to issue investigatory subpoenas, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-801 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.001 (1973), most
jurisdictions deny prosecutors this power. See UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
231, 432, Comment (Proposed Final Draft, 1974). The police also are denied the power to
issue investigatory subpoenas. See Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note
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tions would be unworkable. Second, the subpoena notifies the
party being searched that an investigation is underway and that
the party is in possession of evidence relating to that investigation." This provides the party being searched with an opportunity to remove or destroy the evidence before the police can
seize it. IHI Third, the availability of pre-seizure proceedings
makes the subpoena unsuitable for quick action." Because of
these drawbacks, the subpoena is not as effective an investigatory tool as the warrant. Since the public interest in the production of criminal evidence is substantial, the "subpoena first" rule
should not apply to those situations where the efficacy of criminal investigations will be undermined to an extent not warranted by the public's countervailing interest in personal
privacy.
2. Zurcher and freedom of the press- Newsroom searches
threaten the constitutional rights of the press in two ways. First,
police searches inhibit the ability of the press to gather information for the public. Second, newsroom searches endanger the
ability of the press to disseminate the information gathered.117
Reporters often rely on confidential sources when gathering
much of the information they publish or broadcast.118 Police
searches inhibit information gathering by making confidential
sources reluctant to talk to reporters about sensitive matters. By
creating a danger that the names of these informants will be
38, at 965.
04
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
"" This possibility greatly concerned the Zurcher majority. See 436 U.S. at 561.
.. A number of objections are available, and these objections take time to litigate. For
example, the Zurcher majority noted that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination may be asserted by the recipient of a subpoena but not by an individual
whose privacy is invaded by a police search. The prosecutor, said the Court, would rarely
be able to overcome an assertion of this privilege in the early stages of an investigation
when most warrants are issued. The Court said that the delay in overcoming the privilege would inhibit "the production of evidence with sufficient regularity to satisfy the
public interest in law enforcement." 436 U.S. at 561 n.8. Subpoenas also may be quashed
on other grounds. See A. AMsTElmAM, TRIAL MANuAL FOR THE l>BFBNSE OF CRIMINAL
CASES§ 163 (3d ed. 1974). The Court pointed out that "time spent litigating such matters could seriously impede criminal investigations." 436 U.S. at 561 n.8.
•• The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects the rights of
the press to both gather and disseminate information to the public. See Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,681 (1972) (" .•. without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated); Grosjean v. Associated Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936) (First Amendment protects the right of the press to publish) .
.. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mien. L. RBv. 229
(1971); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. RBv. 18 (1969). See generally Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972).
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exposed during the course of the search, newsroom searches
threaten to dry up these sources of information. No matter how
carefully the warrant is executed, the police necessarily must
rummage through files and desks to locate the materials named
in the warrant. This "rummaging" is likely to expose the names
of confidential informants even when they have no connection
with the investigation. Confidential sources, naturally sensitive
to being· uncovered, are likely to refuse to talk to reporters
rather than run the risk that a newsroom search will expose
them. 119
Newsroom searches also threaten the ability of the press to
disseminate information. One way this occurs is through selfcensorship by reporters. The threat of a police search may cause
reporters to omit references in their stories to evidence possessed by their newspapers that may trigger a search, either to
protect confidential sources from exposure or to save themselves
the ordeal of a police search.eo In either case, the effect may be
to deny valuable information to the public.81
•• See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 572 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting): "It
requires no blind leap of faith to understand that a person who gives information to a
journalist only on condition that his identity will not he revealed will he less likely to
give that information if he knows that, despite the journalist's assurances, his identity
may in fact he disclosed." For more on the effect of disclosure on confidential sources,
see Note, Newsmen's Privilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amend•
ment in Jeopardy, 49 TuL. L. REv. 417 (1975); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege:
Protection of Confidential Associations and Private Communications, 4 U. Mica. J.L.
REF. 85 (1970); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confi·
dential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 316 (1970); Note, The Newsman's Privilege: Govern·
ment Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CALII'. L. RBv.
1198 (1970).
00
The comments of Gene Roberts, New York Times national news editor, illustrate
the potential for self-censorship:
If reporters and photographers believe that the information they gather will he
available to government officials, they will not he eager to get the sensitive story,
or to track down the individual who will supply the critical information. And I,
as an editor, will consider carefully before publishing facts or a photograph
which might imply that there is more than appears.
Brief for Amici Curiae at 22, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), reprinted in
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 197.
•• The effect of newsroom searches on the First Amendment rights of the press is
analogous to the "chilling effect" which the Supreme Court has in other contexts used as
a basis for striking down laws which deter or discourage the exercise of First Amendment
rights. This chilling effect occurs because of the possible applications of an overbroad
statute or rule which, although directed at activities that may be regulated, is so broad as
to possibly encompass protected activities. The Supreme Court has been particulary concerned with the chilling effect on First Amendment rights in the area of legislative investigations, a government activity closely analogous to the police search. See Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963). See also DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S.
825 (1966) (attorney general investigation). For a discussion of "chilling effect," see gen·
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More significantly, police searches may result in the removal
of information necessary for publication. Zurcher does not require the police to wait until publication before searching; once
they learn that a newspaper possesses criminal evidence, the police may obtain a warrant and seize the evidence whether or not
it has been published. 82 By removing the information from the
newsroom, the police, in effect, can block publication of any
story that depends on that information. In addition, the search
itself may disrupt normal newspaper operations.68 If the search
occurs near deadlines, the disruption may be sufficient to prevent publication of an entire edition."
Use of subpoena would alleviate these concerns in several
ways. First, a subpoena does not involve a physical intrusion
into the newsroom. Thus the police would have no occasion to
"rummage" through desks and files, which minimizes the risk of
unnecessary exposure of confidential sources. The lack of physical intrusion also would obviate the risk of disruptions due to
the search itself. Second, a subpoena provides an opportunity
for pre-seizure objection. The newspaper may be able to quash
the subpoena altogether, or at least modify it to release only a
minimum of information. This reduces the risk that confidential
sources will be compromised. The notice and opportunity to object provided by subpoena procedure also would allow enough
time for the newspaper to copy the information sought, thereby
eliminating the risk that the police will be able to block publication by removing materials from the newsroom. The subpoena,
erally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 808, 822-25
(1969).
91
Nothing in normal warrant procedure requires the police to wait to execute a search
once they have established probable cause. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. In Zurcher,
however, this problem did not arise because the search occurred after publication.
83
For instance, police searched the offices of a Los Angeles radio station for eight
hours before concluding that the evidence sought was not on the premises. See Note,
Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 38, at 957. See also Senate Hearings,
supra note 3, at 285-86 (testimony of Tom Becherer, news director, WBAL-TV Baltimore, on the potential physical disruption caused by newsroom searches).
84
A police search, therefore, poses a real danger of resulting in a "prior restraint" on
publication. Protection against prior restraints is at the core of the First Amendment,
and the Supreme Court has traditionally struck down such restraints. See New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
In Zurcher, however, the Court rejected the newspaper's prior restraint arguments.
The Court found prior restraint cases inapplicable because it said newsroom searches
carry "no realistic threat of prior restraint or of any direct restraint whatsoever . . . on
... publication." 436 U.S. at 567.
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therefore, is more protective of press freedom than the warrant.
However, neither the district court's "subpoena first" rule nor
the Zurcher rule permitting unrestricted third-party searches is
entirely satisfactory from a law enforcement standpoint. With
respect to the "subpoena first" rule, the same "hazards to law
enforcement" that are present whenever a third party is subpoenaed also are present when a reporter is subpoenaed. For example, reporters will be notified of the impending search and
. thus will have an opportunity to conceal or destroy the desired
evidence. 811 These legitimate law enforcement concerns caution
against application of a "subpoena first" rule for all newsroom
searches. On the other hand, Zurcher itself may work to thwart
law enforcement in the press context. Police and prosecutors
often use newspaper stories for leads when conducting investigations.66 These investigations naturally will suffer if the sources
for these stories are discouraged from contacting the press for
fear of exposure during the course of a newsroom search. In addition, reporters faced with the possibility of being searched may
prefer to destroy notes and other evidence in their possession as
soon as these materials are no longer necessary for their
stories. 67 Consequently, valuable criminal evidence may be lost.
3. Zurcher and state testimonial privileges- The broad
search and seizure power authorized by Zurcher also could subvert state testimonial privileges. Almost all states recognize, by
common law or statute, a number of privileges from the duty to
testify.es The oldest and most common is the attorney-client
• For example, there were indications in Zurcher that the Stanford Daily had adopted
a policy of destroying photographs of camp\18 demonstrations if served with a subpoena.
436 U.S. at 575 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
• See statement of John Leonard, president of the National District Attorney's Association, 227 NATION 102 (1978): "Prosecutors ... often depend heavily on the published
stories of newsmen for leads into investigations of criminal activity, and much of the
information is obtainable for such stories only if confidential sources are 888ured
anonymity."
.., The chief of the Lee Newspapers bureau in Helena, Montana wrote Congressman
Robert Drinan that the day after Zurcher was announced, "my office began erasing all
tapes and destroying or removing from the premises all confidential records . . . ." Id.
Columnist Carl Rowan noted that reporters are now "committing notes and sources to
memory, burying papers in tin cans or empty whiskey bottles. . . ." Id. And columnist
James Kilpatrick has said he might have to place his files "six feet deep in a sanitary
landfill." Id.
• At common law, "there is a duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and
... any exemptions which exist are distinctly exceptional." 8 WIGMORB, EvmBNCB
§ 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Privileges from testifying were not favored at common
law becaU8e they interfered with the search for truth and conflicted with the maxim that
"the public ... has a right to every man's evidence." Id. Nonetheless, privileges persist
because certain values override the general duty to testify. In the case of most privileges,
the value promoted is free communication between the protected parties. The theory is
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privilege, 69 but testimonial -privileges also exist for doctors, 70
psychologists,71 and priests. 71 In half the states, "shield laws"
protect a journalist's confidential sources from exposure.78 These
privileges are designed to foster certain beneficial relationships
by creating an atmosphere of. complete confidentiality.
Zurcher, however, permits the police to circumvent these privileges. When third parties protected by a testimonial privilege
are subpoenaed, they normally may quash the subpoena on the
basis of the privilege. 7' A subpoena maintains confidentiality because it allows the third party to object before seizure of the
evidence. A warrant, however, makes an objection to the search
based on the existence of a testimonial privilege impossible because it provides no mechanism ·for pre-seizure objections. The
police, therefore, can sidestep the privilege by employing a warrant rather than a subpoena.711 Even if the third party later suethat if communications between parties are protected from disclosure, it will encourage a
free interchange which is deemed essential to the working of a socially beneficial relationship. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EvmENCE 606-07
(1977). For a compilation of states rec~izing testimonial privileges of one kind or another, see generally 8 WIGMORE, supra; at § 2197.
.. In general form, the attorney-client privilege provides that:
[w)here legal advice of any kind is sought·from a professional legal advisor in his
capacity as such, the communication relating to that purpoee, made in confidence by the client, are at his insistence permanently protected from disclosure
by himself or by the legal advisor, except the protection be waived.
8 WIGM0RE, supra note 68; at § 2292 at 554. For examples of modem attorney-client
privilege statutes, see NEV. REv. STAT; §§ 49.035-n.115 (1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03
(West 1975).
0
•
A physician-patient privilege exists by common law or statute in two-thirds of
American jurisdictions. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 68, at § 2380.
71
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1516 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25-9 (1974).
These statutes must be distinguished from those creating a psychiatrist-patient privilege,
which would be encompassed by the general physician-patient privilege existing in many
states. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 68, at § 2286 at 534 n.23.
•• See, e.g., ARK. UNIFORM RULES OF EvmENCE 505.
78
See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1956); MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.5a (1970).
See generally Note, Newsmen's Privileges Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes, supra
note 59, at 429.
·
Most of these statutes, however, only pertain to subpoenas directed at newsmen; they
do not restrict the availability of search warrants. Nevertheless, these statutes evidence a
state policy that the confidential relationship between reporters and their sources should
be protected.
" See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 56, at § 163.
,. The potential for subverting state testimonial privileges is illustrated by the experience of one Minnesota lawyer whose offices were searched only two months after
Zurcher. Similar problems have arisen in California and Oregon. See Lawscope-Criminal Justice, 65 A.B.A.J. 1777 (1979). See also Senate Hearings, supra note
3, at 223-78 (testimony of Jerome -S. Seigler, Chairman, American Psychiatric Assoc.
Comm. on Confidentiality, on the effects of Zurcher on the confidentiality of patient
records).
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ceeds in recovering the seized evidence,78 the search and seizure
will have destroyed confidentiality. This will deter future confidential exchanges and undermine the relationships the privilege
was meant to protect.
Here again, however, a "subpoena first" rule poses problems
for law enforcement in certain situations. One concern raised by
opponents of a "subpoena first" rule was that criminals would
use the rule as a shield by placing potentially incriminating evidence in the hands of their supposedly innocent attorneys.77 Obviously, the policy behind the "subpoena first" rule stands opposed to such a result, and the rule should be limited so that
such situations do not occur. Congress should consider the possible impact of a "subpoena first" rule intended to safeguard testimonial privileges on law enforcement interests, and tailor its legislation to minimize that impact.
II.

THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the unrestricted thirdparty police searches Zurcher authorized have the potential for
undermining important rights and liberties.78 On the other hand,
a broad "subpoena first". ·rule applicable to all third-party
searches may create intolerable burdens on law enforcement. 79
In passing the Privacy Protection Act, Congress was well aware
of these competing considerations.ao_ As a result, the Act repre•• Under some circumstances, a third party can petition the court for the return of
materials seized in Ii police search. See A.. AMlrrBRDAM, supra note 56, at § 224.
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 15 (statement of Sen. William L. Soott).
•• In Zurcher, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the effect of unrestricted thirdparty searches on individual rights as insubstantial. For example, in rejecting journalists'
fears of the "chilling effect" that newsroom searches would cause, the Court said it was
not convinced "that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress
news because of fears of warranted searches." 436 U.S. at 566. The Court pointed out
that there have been "only a very few instances in the entire United States since 1971
involving the issuance of warrants for searching newspaper premises." Id. See House
Hearings, supra note 4, at 165-56 (AppendiI B, statement of the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press) (detailing 14 newsroom searches that have occurred since
1971); see also TIME, Aug. 11, 1980, at 66 (describing two press searches occurring since
the Zurcher decision). The key concern, however, is not with how many newsroom or
other third-party searches already have occurred but rather with how many will occur in
the future now that the Supreme Court has declared such searches legal. See Bayh, Congressional Response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 13 INmIANA L. RBv. 835, 861-62
("there is every reason to believe that the number of third party searches will increase").
,. Opponents of Zurcher legislation, however, have greatly exaggerated these "burdens" on law enforcement. See notes 97-102 and accompanying text infra.
00
See, e.g., the comments of Sen. Birch Bayh, one of the strongest supporters of
Zurcher legislation:

534

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 14:3

sents an accommodation of the individual's rights and liberties
with the public interest in effective law enforcement. 81
The Act is divided into two parts. Title I, "First Amendment
Privacy Protection," defines unlawful acts, prohibiting searches
and seizures of certain materials unless one of several broad exceptions apply. The number of applicable exceptions depends on
the kind of materials sought by the police. If the police are
searching for "work product," only two exceptions to the general
no-search rule exist. 811 If, however, the police are searching for
"documentary materials," an additional two exceptions apply.88
Moreover, Title I stipulates that the Act does not apply to all
third-party searches, limiting its scope to searches of persons
who intend to disseminate a "form of public communication.""
Finally, Title I establishes remedies for violations of the statutory scheme, providing generally for a civil cause of action,
under certain circumstances, against both the individual officer
involved and the governmental entity responsible for the offender.811 It also provides for liquidated damages,88 and grants
the federal district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Act. 87
Title II of the Act provides some protection for third parties
not covered by Title I. This portion of the Act mandates that
the United States Attorney General promulgate guidelines for
the conduct of federal third-party searches not involving persons
disseminating a "form of public communication."88 It also requires that the guidelines incorporate certain provisions. 811
It is a very delicate . . . issue that we are dealing with. . . . It requires . . . a
delicate balance. On one side, we have no desire . . . to tie the hands of law
enforcement. . . . [On the other hand], if you are innocent ... you shouldn't
have a knock on the door in the middle of the night.
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 12-13.
81
See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS PRIVACY PRoTEcnoN
Acr OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1064, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT]; SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRIVACY PROTECTION Acr OF 1980, S.
REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPoRT]. See
also Bayh, supra note 78, at 844.
u Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ lOl(a). "Work product" and "documentary materials" are defined at § 107.
u Id. § lOl(b) .
.. Id. § 101. The Act specifically includes newspapers, books, and broadcasts under the
heading of "public communication."
88
Id. § 106(a).
• Id. § 106({).
"" Id. § 106(h). The Act, however, does not apply to "searches and seizures at the
borders of, or at international points of, entry into the United States in order to enforce
the customs laws of the United States." Id. § 105.
• Id. § 201(a).
• Id. § 201(a)(l)-(4).
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The Act is designed to address the issues raised by Zurcher
and to accommodate both the privacy and press interests. involved, and the countervailing law enforcement interests. The
Act, however, tips the balance too heavily in favor .of law enforcement by (1) leaving large groups of third parties affected by
Zurcher largely unprotected, (2) creating unnecessary loopholes
for the police to circumvent the protections that are afforded,
and (3) providing ineffective remedies for police violations.
A.

Parties Protected

One of the key concerns of Zurcher critics was the decision's
impact on privacy rights, 90 a concern that provided a strong impetus for passage of the Privacy Protection Act. The title, however, is a misnomer because the Act does not protect the general
public's right to privacy. The substantive provisions of the bill
safeguard only those third parties involved in information dissemination. The key to the legislation is the concept of "public
communication; the Act only protects persons who intend to disseminate to the public a "form of public communication."91 The
Act does not attempt to protect any particular group but instead
strives to safeguard the flow of information to the public.91
Thus, while reporters clearly come within the purview of the
statute, the Act also protects academicians, authors, filmmakers,
free lance writers and photographers. 93 By focusing on the information involved rather than on specific groups, the Act avoids
the thorny problem of defining "the press.',.. However, because
00
Except for the Department of Justice, "not a single witness in favor of the legislation testified that the protections of the bill should be limited to the press alone." Hou8B
REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. Journalists, in fact, "were among the strongest proponents
of expanding the legislation to protect all innocent third parties from arbitrary search
and seizure." Id.
01
Section 101 of the Act, which deals. with unlawful acts, prohibits searches of "a
person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper,
book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication." This language is intended to protect only those persons engaged in First Amendment activities of some
kind. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5-6; SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 9-10.
" The drafters specifically rejected the idea of a "press only" bill. Instead, the statute
was designed to "avoid the chilling effects of disruptive searches on the ability to obtain
and publish information for all those who have a purpose to disseminate information."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 9. See also HousE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5.
" HousE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5.
.. The problems of defining "the press" prevented Congress from passing a federal
ahield law to protect reporters from investigatory subpoenas in the wake of Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), which approved the use of such subpoenas directed at journalists. See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 352 (prepared statement of Philip Heymann, Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General). The Act's drafters were well aware of the
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the Act only protects persons possessing information to be disseminated to the public, it excludes a large portion of non-suspects affected by Zurcher. In addition, the legislation does not
specifically protect persons who may be covered by state testimonial privileges, another -group threatened by Zurcher..,,
The main justification for not including all third parties
within the scope of the Act was that it would increase the risk of
impeding criminal investigations by requiring that the procedures established by the Act be applied to a greatly expanded
class of persons." These concerns, however, are greatly exaggerated. First, opponents of a broad third-party search bill overstated the importance of search warrants to criminal investigations. In fact the majority of searches are conducted without a
warrant as an incident to arrest,.., or under one of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement.98 Search and seizure also is
only one of a number of avenues open to the police to obtain
criminal evidence." Second and more importantly, a non-suspect in the vast majority of third-party search situations will relinquish the desired evidence voluntarily when served with a
subpoena. A true non-suspect will have no connection with the
crime or the criminal involved and thus have little motive for
"extreme difficulties of arriving at a workable definition of the press." HouSB RBPoRT,
supra note 81, at 5.
" Like all other third parties not involved in information dissemination, persons
covered by state testimonial privileges are-fu be protected at the federal level by J11Stice
Department guidelines governing the issuance of warrants to search third parties. Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 201(a)(3). At the state level, however, third parties not involved in information dissemination are left to the mercy of state legislatures.
" See SENATE 8.BPoRT, supra note 81, at 8. See generally House Hearings, supra note
4, at 164-79; and Senate Hearings, ·supra note 3, at 296-325, for a disCl18Bion of law
enforcement concerns.
., See Y. KAMisAR, et. al., supra note 42, at 5, 266; L. TlnANY, D. McINTYRE & D.
RoTENBERG, supra note 46, at 105.
Of course, one may question why there is such great concem with third-party searches
when the police do not depend heavily on search warrants. There are two reasons why
the concerns are still valid. First, it is likely that third-party searches will increase now
that the police know they are authorized· to conduct such searches. Second, although
third-party searches may not occur often, their impact on privacy rights is substantial in
those cases where they do occur. For these reasons, third-party searches should be restricted even though they are not now widely 118ed.
18
Y. KAMlsAR, et. al., supra note 42, at 266. For a discl18sion of exceptions to the
warrant requirement, see note 124 and accompanying text infra.
" For example, the police gather much information through direct observation or surveillance, "tips" from the public or informants, access to public records, and interrogations of victims. See Note, Search and Seizure of the Media, supra note 38, at 993-94. In
fact, it has only been since 1967 that the police could search for evidentiary materials by
means of a warrant, even from s11Spects. See note 34 supra. This further undermines the
police contention that extending the "subpoena first" rule to all third parties would
create intolerable burdens on law .~orcem~nt.
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withholding evidence from the police. 100 Where the police have
reasonable grounds to believe that the non-suspect will not voluntarily cooperate, carefully defined exceptions to the "subpoena first" rule will protect law enforcement interests adequately.101 Finally, the risk to criminal investigations posed by a
broad third-party search rule can be. minimized by requiring a
lesser burden of proof to show that a subpoena would be impractical in the case of persons not involved in information dissemination. •os No reason exists, therefore, for a blanket exclusion of
the great majority of persons affected by Zurcher. 101
As pointed out by the Zurcher dissenters, "(c]ountless law-abiding citizens -doctors, lawyers, merchants, customers, bystanders-may have documents that relate to an
ongoing criminal investigation." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 579 (Stevena, J.,
dissenting). There is no justification for assuming, as opponents of a broad third-party
search rule do, that these normally law-abiding citizens will ignore a subpoena and proceed to conceal or destroy evidence.
·
To make this assumption, however, third parties who possess purely documentary
materials must be distinguished from those that possess other types of criminal evidence
such as contraband. Third· parties who possess documentary evidence may be quite common· and possession of this type of evidence alone does not suggest that the third party is
sufficiently culpable to have a motive for destroying or concealing evidence. But possession of evidence such as contraband indicates that the third party has a sufficient connection with the crinle that he cannot be trusted to preserve the evidence sought. In such
situations, resort to a subpoena would indeed be "impractical" and a warrant would be
justified. This was recognized by the Zurcher dissenters, id. at 579-82, and is reflected in
the Privacy Protection Act's provision excluding "contraband or the fruits of crinle or
things otherwise criminally possessed" from the statute's scope. Privacy Protection Act,
supra note 5, at § 107(a)-(b).
1 1
•
For example, the Act excludes from the "subpoena first" requirement those situations where the police have a reasonable belief that the third party being searched will
remove or destroy the evidence sought if notified of the impending search. Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101(b)(3). For other exceptions to the "subpoena first"
rule, see notes 134-154 and accompanying text infra.
Where reasonable doubts arise about the willingness of a non-suspect to cooperate,
these doubts probably will be resolved in the police's favor because warrants are obtained e:c parte before sympathetic magistrates. See Note, Search and Seizure of the
Media, supra note 38, at 986. This provides additional assurance that law enforcement
interests will be adequately safeguarded.
100
For example, while the statute currently requires that the police establish by
"probable cause" that the person possessing information to be disseminated to the public is a suspect, § lOl(a)(l), the Act could require only "reason to believe" as the standard for a third party not involved in disseminating information. But see note 161 and
accompanying text infra for a discussion of problems with this standard.
108
In fact, there are administrative reasons for including all third parties within the
purview of the Act. As law enforcement officials themselves have pointed out, most warrants are sought in the early stages of an investigation when there is little information
available about the person being searched. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at
319 (statement of the National District Attorney Association). The Act as it stands now,
however, requires that the police determine w~ether or not a person possesses information to be disseminated to the public because the Act only protects information disseminators. Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ lOl(a)-(b). This determination must be
made at the warrant proceeding, precisely when the police have the least information
100
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The Act does attempt to protect those third parties not involved in informing the public by mandating that the Justice
Department develop guidelines for third-party searches not covered by the Act. 104 The guidelines, which apply to any federal
officer or employee who seeks documentary materials possessed
by a non-suspect in connection with a criminal investigation,1 06
must recognize "the personal privacy interests of the person in
possession of such documentary materials,"106 particulary those
of third parties such as lawyers and clients or doctors and
patients who are involved in a "known confidential relationship. "107 The guidelines also must call for use of the least intrusive means of obtaining the information sought. 108 Except in
emergencies, a United States Attorney must approve an application for a warrant under the guidelines. 109 When adopted, the
available to them. This would delay and in some cases totally frustrate the warrant proceeding. See note 168 and accompanying text infra. By eliminating the distinction between third parties who are disseminating information and those who are not, a determination of whether or not the Act applies would be unnecessary-it always would apply
unless the party being searched is a suspect. This would streamline the warrant proceedings by eliminating one step and thus minimize the risk of delay.
1
°' Section 201 of the Act provides that:
The Attorney General shall ... issue guidelines for the procedures to be employed by any Federal officer or employee, in connection with the investigation
or prosecution of an offense, to obtain documentary materials ·in the private possession of a person when the person is not reasonably believed to be a suspect in
such offense or related by blood or marriage to such a suspect, and when the
materials sought are not contraband or the fruits or instrumentalities of an
offense.
The Justice Department has proposed guidelines to comply with § 201. Department of
Justice Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Parties, 46 Fed. Reg. 1302 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. pt. 59). The guidelines establish procedures to be used by "any federal officer or employee, in connection With the
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to obtain documentary materials in the
private posseBBion of a disinterested third party." Id. § 69.3(a). The guidelines require
the use of a "subpoena, summons or other less intrusive alternative means" rather than a
warrant unleBB this would "substantially jeopardize the availability or usefulness of the
materials sought." Id. § 69.4(a)(l). They also require that any application for a warrant
to search third parties be approved by a United States Attorney. Id. § 69.4(a)(2). The
guidelines also provide for additional protections where the use of a warrant "may intrude upon professional, confidential relationships." Id. § 69.4(b). For violations, the
guidelines provide that the violator "shall be subject to disciplinary action by the agency
or department by which he is employed." Id. § 69.6(a). They do not, however, specify
what form this disciplinary action shall take.
106
Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 201(a).
108
Id. § 201(a)(l).
107
Id. § 201(a)(3).
108
Id. § 201(a)(2). The drafters expected that the guidelines would require an informal
request or a subpoena whenever these present an effective alternative to search by warrant, subject to exceptions paralleling those contained in the statute for searches of persons involved in information dissemination. SENATE RBPoRT, supra note 81, at 19.
109
Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 201(a)(4). In emergencies, another "ap-
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guidelines will have the full force and effect of Justice Department regulations, and any employee or officer violating the
guidelines is to be subject to disciplinary action. 110
The guidelines are unlikely, however, to protect the privacy
rights of a majority of non-suspects adequately. First, the guidelines are only binding on the federal government, yet the Justice
Department and the statute's drafters recognized that most
third-party searches occur at the state and local level. 111 Second,
violations of the guidelines cannot be litigated. 111 The only sanction provided for noncomplicance is disciplinary action by the
Justice Department itself, 118 and this is inadequate because law
enforcement officials are reluctant to discipline themselves. 114
The Act, therefore, should have covered all third parties in its
substantive provisions.
Extending the Act's protections to all non-suspects, however,
will not adequately protect all the interests at stake. Although
such a change will safeguard the public's general right to privacy, it will not protect the special interest in confidentiality
that third parties such as journalists and professionals covered
by state testimonial privileges possess. These third parties deserve additional protection from police searches because of the
societal interest in protecting the confidentiality of these relationships, an interest not present with most other third parties.
This interest in confidentiality will not be adequately protected
by merely extending the Act's protections to all third parties because circumstances justifying an invasion of the public's general
propriate supervisory official" may approve the application for a warrant, but a U.S.
Attorney must be notified within 24 hours.
Section 202 of the Act states that "any violation of these guidelines shall make the
employee or officer involved subject to appropriate disciplinary action." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 202.
111
See note 199 and accompanying text infra.
111
Section 202 provides that "an issue relating to the compliance, or the failure to
comply, with guidelines issued pursuant to this title may not be litigated." Privacy
Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 202. In addition, evidence obtained in violation of the
guidelines cannot be suppressed or excluded solely because of such violation. Id.
§ 106(e). The drafters apparently agreed with the Justice Department that litigability
would be "both burdensome and unnecessary to achieve the purposes of the guidelines."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 20. The drafters, however, said they expected "good
faith" compliance with the guidelines. Id.
111
See note 110 supra.
,.. Police departments are notoriously lax in punishing officers for search and seizure
violations. See Gelles, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and
Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 621, 718. In addition, municipal leaders responsible
for overseeing police departments rarely pressure the police to abide by search and
seizure requirements. See Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALB L.J. 781,
812-14 (1979).

no
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right to privacy may not justify intruding on this greater interest
in confidentiality. To protect this interest, the Act should provide that where the police intend to search a party involved in a
known confidential relationship, 1111 the materials seized must be
sealed without examination and placed in the court's custody
until the court determines that the need for the materials outweighs the special interest in confidentiality enjoyed by these
parties.116 If the court determines that the interest in confidentiality is outweighed, the police are assured that the materials will
be immediately available; if the court decides that this interest
is not outweighed, the materials can be returned with confidentiality still intact.

B. Protection Afforded
1. The general "no search" rule- The portion of the Act
defining unlawful acts tracks in substance the district court's
"subpoena first" rule rejected in Zurcher. Congress clearly intended that subpoenas would be the customary means of searching third parties unless one of several exceptions applied. This
portion of the Act, however, contains two significant drafting
errors that should be corrected to insure that the Act is not misinterpreted: (1) the operative sections seem to prohibit even
searches conducted by means of a subpoena unless one of the
several exceptions apply, and (2) these sections also seem to outlaw warrantless searches altogether. Congress intended neither
of these results when it passed the Act.
The statute's language flatly prohibits searches and seizures of
This would include all journalists and any professionals who are protected by that
state's testimonial privileges. The Act, in fact, already requires that the Attorney General, in promulgating guidelines for searching third parties not covered by the Act, must
recognize the "special concern for privacy interests in cases in which a search or seizure
. . . would intrude upon a known confidential relationship such as that which may exist
between a clergyman and parishioner; lawyer and client; or doctor and patient." Privacy
Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 201(a)(3).
11
• See, e.g., H.R. 3837, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which provides that search warrants "shall prescribe appropriate provisions to protect all privileged matters, and such
protection shall include . . . sealing or guarding such objects without examination until
such non-suspect can be heard by the magistrate or judge." The American Law Institute
has suggested a similar provision in another context. See MODEL CODE or PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.5 (Official Draft No. 1, 1972). While this procedure may be unworkable in certain cases where the police must examine documents to determine
whether or not they are encompassed by the warrant, see note 49 and accompanying text
supra, it at least will minimize the intrusion into confidential matters in the majority of
111

cases.
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certain materials unless one of several exceptions apply. 117 This
language, however, is misleading because Congress meant to restrict only surprise police searches conducted by means of a warrant.118 Subpoena searches are outside the scope of the Act's
prohibitions; the police may always resort to a subpoena to obtain desired evidence regardless of whether or not they would be
entitled to use a warrant under the Act. The Act, therefore,
should specifically state that it applies only to warrants, and
that subpoena searches are outside its ambit. The Act should
not, however, use the term "subpoena" to refer to alternatives to
warrants. Many jurisdictions do not permit the police to use
subpoenas as an investigatory device. 119 In some jurisdictions,
for example, investigatory subpoenas are available only through
grand jury proceedings and these proceedings may not be in session at the time of the search. 11° Consequently, the police in
these jurisdictions would be forced always to rely on warrants to
conduct third-party searches, and they would have no recourse if
they could not satisfy one of the exceptions to the "subpoena
first" rule in the Act. Congress, however, did not intend to force
the police always to rely on warrants to search third parties..
.The Act, therefore, should make clear that only warrants are
subject to the restrictions on searches and seizures stated in the
statute. It also should indicate that any mechanism by which the
party to be searched is notified of the impending search and allowed to object, including but not limited to subpoenas duces
tecum, suffices to escape the Act's requirements for warrants. 111
117
Under the section detailing "unlawful acts," for example, the Act states that "it
shall be unlawful for a government officer or employee . . . to search for or seize any . . .
materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to
the public a . . . form of public communication." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5,
at § 101. Because the Supreme Court has said that subpoenas of evidentiary materials
are "searches" subject to Fourth Amendment requirements, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906), the phrase "search for or seize" in § 101 could be misinterpreted as prohibiting
even searches conducted by means of a subpoena.
11
• It is clear that the drafters distinguished warrants from subpoenas and only intended to subject warrants to the restrictions of the statute. See, e.g., HousB RBPoRT,
supra note 81, at 4 ("It [the Act] does not prohibit lawful searches of third parties. It
simply requires the use of a subpoena first to obtain documentary materials unless any
one of five exceptions ... apply."). See also SENATE RBPoRT, supra note 81, at 11 ("only
two exceptional circumstances will allow a search warrant procedure instead of a subpoena")(emphasis added).
119
See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
110
See Bayh, supra note 78, at 856.
111
The statute provides a one-year grace period from the date of enactment "so that
state and local governments will have sufficient time to make any necessary procedural
changes in their laws to comply" with the Act. SENATE RBPoRT, supra note 81, at 17-18.
Such changes, however, would be unnecessary if the statute simply recognized that
searches conducted after notice and an adversary hearing are not within its ambit. See,
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As long as notice and an opportunity to be heard - the essential features of a subpoena - are provided, the statute's restrictions should not apply.m
The statute's language also seems to prohibit warrantless
third-party searches. 118 There are many situations, however,
where the police do not need a warrant to execute a search. In
these situations, the normal warrant requirement is excused because there is a need to move quickly and circumstances make it
impractical to obtain a timely warrant. 114 Requiring the police to
resort to a subpoena when the circumstances excuse the use of a
warrant is illogical, and would upset an established body of law
regarding warrantless searches. The Act should explicitly state
that it is not meant to affect the law regarding searches without
a warrant, and that the police do not have to comply with its
provisions where a warrantless search would be justified.
2. Materials protected: "work product" and "documentary
materials"- The Act only protects certain kinds of materials,111
e.g., H.R. 283, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) ("It shall be unlawful for any person acting
under color of law, without a prior adversary court proceeding, to search any
place. . . .") (emphasis added).
111
Although the statute should avoid use of the term "subpoena," this article will
continue to use the phrase "subpoena first" for convenience.
111
This was a major concern of law enforcement officials in testimony before Congress.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 303 (testimony of James Zagel, Counsel for the
National District Attorneys Association).
114
Although searches conducted without a warrant nomially are per se unreasonable,
see note 41 supra, the Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the warrant
requirement. The most important exception is the search incident to arrest. The Court
has allowed warrantless searches of the person of a validly arrested person, United States
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and of
the immediate area under the control of the arrested person, Hill v. California, 401 U.S.
797 (1971); Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Warrantless searches also have
been upheld in exceptional circumstances where "seizure is impossible except without a
warrant." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56 (1925) (upholding a warrantless
automobile search "because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought"). Other exceptional circumstances may
arise in the course of an emergency where entry is needed to protect property or to save
lives. See generally Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 419 (1972).
In addition, warrantless searches are permitted where the person being searched
consents to the search. United States v. Matson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
111
The Act only protects materials intended for dissemination to the public in a "form
of public communication." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101. This term,
however, is meant to have a broad meaning. It includes not only materials to be disseminated to the public or which contain information to be incorporated in a public communication, but also materials gathered for the purpose of disseminating them to the public
but which at some point are determined to be unsuitable for publication. For example, a
reporter may write a story which is not published; the reporter's notes and drafts of the
article are nevertheless protected. However, there must be an intent to disseminate in-
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distinguishing between materials defined as "work product" and
those defined as "documentary materials." This distinction,
however, does not make sense in terms of the First Amendment
values the Act is intended to protect. Moreover, the distinction
creates administrative headaches for the police at a time in the
investigatory process where delays can be critical. Work product
is defined as materials "prepared, produced, authored or created
. . . for the purposes of communicating such materials to the
public."198 It includes the "mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or theories" of the author. 117 The term is patterned after the definition of work product in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. m Documentary materials, on the other hand, are
simply "materials upon which information is recorded."'be It includes "written or printed materials, photographs, motion picture films, negatives, video tapes, audio tapes, and other
mechanically, magentically [sic] or electronically recorded cards,
tapes or discs." 180 Neither term includes the fruits or instrumentalities of crime, or contraband. 131 Possession of such materials
makes the third party sufficiently culpable to justify a surprise
search. 1311
formation to the public; where such intent is lacking, the materials are not protected.
Thus, the internal records of a business, for example, would not constitute a "form of
public communication" because they are not intended for public disclosure. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 81, at 10.
111
Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 107(b). The definition is intended to
cover "materials whose very creation arises out of a purpose to convey information to the
public." SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 17. Such materials may be created by the
person in possession of the materials or by another person in anticipation of public communication. For example, financial records of a business obtained by a member of the
press are not work product because they were not originally created "to communicate to
the public." But a report prepared by a reporter based on those records would constitute
work product, as would a report prepared by a "whistle-blower" in government who intends that the contents be disclosed to the public. Id.
The photographs which were the subject of the search in Zurcher would be "work
product" under the Act. HousE REPORT, supra note 81, at 12.
117
Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 107(b)(3).
111
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 17; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3), governing discovery of attorneys' work product.
'" Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 107(a).
ISO Id.
'" The fruits of crime are the ends or objects that a criminal intends to obtain from
his criminal activity. An example is stolen property. The instrumentalities of crime are
those things, such as burglar tools, that facilitate the commission of a crime. Contraband
is goods or things, such as narcotics, the possession of which is a crime. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 81, at 16-17.
181
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (possession
of such materials "gives rise to two inferences: that the custodian is involved in the criminal activity, and that, if given notice of an intended search, he will conceal or destroy
what is being sought"). See also note 100 supra.
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a. The "work product" exceptions- The drafters of the
statute apparently felt that work product is more worthy of protection than documentary materials because work product involves a creative mental process. 188 Accordingly, the Act permits
the police to search for work product by means of a warrant in
only two exceptional circumstances. The first is where the party
in possession of the evidence sought is suspected of involvement
in the crime under investigation. 184 This exception is obvious;
the notice provided by a subpoena gives suspects the opportunity to conceal or destroy evidence. 1811 The exception, however, is
qualified by a proviso that if the only crime of which the party
being searched is suspected is the receipt or possession of the
materials sought, the suspect exception does not apply. 188 This
proviso prevents police, who may actually be seeking to uncover
confidential sources or to block publication, from searching
newsrooms on the pretense that the reporter possesses "stolen
property. " 187
The proviso is subject to a qualification, however. The suspect
exception to the "subpoena first" rule is retained where the
crime under investigation concerns the receipt, possession or
communication of secret or restricted data. 188 The gravity of
these crimes led the drafters to retain the search power in these
circumstances. 189 This exception, however, provides a potential
loophole for government officials to plug embarrassing leaks of
information to the press. For example, the qualification could
have authorized the police to search for and seize the documents
used to publish the Pentagon Papers, because many of these
materials were classified at the time. 140 As a result, public debate
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 10.
The statute permits surprise searches where there is "probable cause to believe
that the person possessing such materials has committed or is committing the criminal
offense to which the materials relate." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at
§ lOl(a)(l).
,.. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
,aa Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § lOl(a)(l).
••• For example, if a reporter knowingly received a stolen report, the suspect exception
would apply because the reporter would be guilty of receiving stolen property. The drafters felt that this would unduly broaden the suspect exception because the police could
charge journalists with receipt of stolen property in many cases. SENATE REPoRT, supra
note 81, at 11.
, .. Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § lOl(a)(l) .
... SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 11.
0
"
See N. SHEEHAN, H. SMITH, E. KENWORTHY & F. BUTTERFIELD, THE PENTAGON PAPERS (1971). See also New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (government attempts to restrain publication of the Pentagon Papers rejected on First Amendment grounds). Several journalists testifying before Congress expressed the fear that the
suspect exception could be used to justify surprise searches for purloined government
11
•

114
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on issues of extreme importance could be squelched. This qualification, therefore, should be limited to situations where the national security - not merely the "secret" or "restricted" status
of the documents sought - is genuinely threatened by
disclosure. 141
The second exception to the "subpoena first" rule for work
product is where the materials sought are necessary to prevent
death or serious bodily injury. m This exception seems warranted because society's interest in preserving the lives of its citizens justifies the search under any circumstances. 148
No other exceptions are provided for obtaining work product
by search warrant. Even if the police believe that the third party
will conceal ·or destroy the evidence sought if notified of the impending search, they still must resort to a subpoena. 14' The
drafters apparently felt that the creative processes represented
by work product are so central to the First Amendment that the
proper penalty for failure to produce the evidence when subpoenaed should be contempt of court. 1411
b. The "documentary materials" exceptions-Documentary
materials, however, may be sought by warrant under any of four
circumstances. In addition to the two exceptions applicable to
work product, 148 there are two situations where the police may
search for documentary materials without resort to a subpoena.
First, such materials may be seized by warrant where there is
reason to believe that the notice provided by a subpoena would
result in the destruction, alteration, or concealment of the evidence sought. 147 This exception is justified because the "subpoena first" rule is not designed to remove evidence permadocuments. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 75 (testimony of William Small,
CBS News Director).
"' The government should be required to show more than that the materials are classified or restricted; it should also carry a "heavy burden" of showing that disclosure of
the material would involve "a direct, immediate and irreparable injury to the national
security." House Hearings, supra note 4, at 105 (prepared statement of Robert Lewis,
Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, Society of Professional Journalists).
141
Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101(a)(2).
148
In fact, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the warrant
requirement for entries necessitated by life-threatening situations. See generally Mascolo, supra note 124. Since a warrant is not even required in these situations, it would be
illogical to require resort to a subpoena.
144
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 12. Of course, the person subpoenaed could still
be prosecuted under destruction of evidence statutes in existence in many states. See,
e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 162,295 (1971).
"" SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 12.
"" Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § lOl(b)(l)-(2).
"' Id. § 10l(b)(3). For examples of such situations, see HousE REPORT, supra note 81,
at 9.
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nently from the reach of the police, but only to provide the
party being searched with notice and an opportunity to object. 148
If the notice provided would make the evidence unavailable,
then the public interest in effective criminal investigations becomes overriding, and a search is justified. The drafters listed
three factors which a magistrate should consider in evaluating
the likelihood that the evidence will be destroyed or concealed:
whether there exists a close personal, family, or business relationship between the party in possession and the suspected
criminal; whether the party in possession has concealed or destroyed evidence in the past; or whether the party in possession
has evidenced an intent to conceal or destroy the evidence.149
Second, documentary materials may be searched for by warrant when the party in possession fails to comply with a subpoena, and either all appellate remedies have been exhausted or
"there is reason to believe that the delay . . . occasioned by further proceedings ... would threaten the interests of justice."1 '°
Among the factors which the drafters felt a magistrate should
consider to decide whether such a threat exists are: the immediacy of the need for the materials; the importance of the materials to the investigation; and the severity of the crime under
investigation. m
This "interests of justice,' exception is troubling. Failure to respond to a subpoena after all appellate remedies have been exhausted jutifies a search because the party being searched has
been afforded an opportunity to object to the police request, and
the objections have been overruled. The party has been afforded
his day in court; further refusal to turn over the materials is unjustified. But the "interests of justice" provision allows the police to search before the third party has had a full day in court.
The standard is exceedingly vague 11111 and subverts both the
141
See Bayh, supra note 78, at 860. AB Senator Bayh put it, "[t]he issue of Stanford
Daily is not whether police may obtain relevant evidence, but how they may obtain it."
Id. at 852.
141
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 13. This could cause problems for news organizations that routinely destroy notes after publication. For example, there was evidence in
Zurcher that the Stanford Daily had adopted a policy of destroying photographs of demonstrators if served with a subpoena. See note 65 supra. Such evidence, of course, would
satisfy the statute's "destruction of evidence" exception.
,ao Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101(b)(4).
111
SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 13. The drafters also indicated that the judge or
magistrate should consider both the privacy interests protected by the Act and the interest in full appellate review. Id.
111
It has been suggested that this exception could be invoked anytime a subpoena is
contested "[s)ince any delay in a judicial proceeding may, in some sense, be threatening
to the interests of justice." House Hearings, supra note 4, at 31 (testimony of Paul
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"subpoena first" rule and the policy favoring full appellate review. Moreover, most of the situations where the "interests of
justice" demand an immediate search are covered by the other
exceptions to the "subpoena first" rule provided in the statute. iaa The legislation should not have been weakened by inclusion of this vague standard as a further exception to the rule.
Instead, the court should be required to make a specific finding
that the severity of the crime and the immediacy of the need for
the materials sought, coupled with the societal importance of the
case, outweighs the privacy and due process interests
involved. 114
The statute, however, fails to include an important exception
to the "subpoena first" rule. Because warrants typically are
sought in the early stages of an investigation, the police do not
always know who is the occupant or owner of the premises to be
searched. 1611 In such cases, a subpoena would be inappropriate
because the police would not know on whom to serve the subpoena. Even if that person is known, he may try to evade being
served with the subpoena. 1116 The statute, therefore, should provide specifically that resort to a subpoena is excused where the
occupant or owner of the premises to be searched cannot be
located. 1117
c. Burdens of proof- For both work product and documenDavis, President, Radio Television News Directors Association).
118
There are, however, situations not covered by the exceptions to the "subpoena
fint" rule where criminal investigations would be frustrated by the long appellate process available to subpoenaed persons. For example, the "interests of justice" would be
threatened where exhaustion of appellate remedies would cause difficulties in meeting
the applicable statute of limitations or the provisions of the federal Speedy Trial Act.
· See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 14 (prepared statement of Philip Heymann, Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General). The "interests of justice" exception, therefore,
lhould be retained but its language should be made more specific. See note 154 and
accompanying text infra.
114
See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 32 (prepared statement of Paul Davis, President, Radio Television News Directors Association). As it stands now, the Act does not
specifically require the judge or magistrate to engage in this balancing. See Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101(b)(4). The only guidance comes from the drafters'
comments. See note 151 and accompanying text supra.
, .. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 561. Traditionally, the police were not
required to name the owner or occupant of the premises to be searched when requesting
a warrant. United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanger v. United
States, 398 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1968); Dixon v. United States, 211 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1954).
,.. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 312-13 (testimony of James B. Zagel, National
District Attorneys Association) .
.., The magistrate, however, should determine that the police have made a "good
faith" effort to locate the owner or occupant. See, e.g., S. 1816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
I 3(3) (1979) ("a warrant may issue if . . . the identity of the person in possession or
control of the matter sought cannot be determined within a reasonable time with reasonable effort").
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tary materials, the statute provides different burdens of proof to
show that an exception applies, depending on the exception being invoked. If the suspect exception is relied on, the police must
establish its applicability by "probable cause. " 1118 For all other
exceptions, the police need only establish "reason to believe"
that an exception applied. m There is no reason to provide different standards, however. The probable cause standard for invoking the suspect exception is not very exacting; the courts
have interpreted probable cause in other contexts merely to
mean reasonable suspicion. 180 The "reason to believe" standard
would lower even this minimal requirement further, authorizing
searches by warrant where the police merely suspect that one of
the exceptions applies. 181 Although it is not the statute's purpose
to place insurmountable obstacles before the police, the Act
should require more than mere suspicion. Because probable
cause is easily established and because it has an established
meaning, 182 the police should be required to satisfy this burden
whenever they invoke one of the exceptions to the "subpoena
first" rule.
3. A suggested reform: abolish the distinction between
"work product" and "documentary materials"- Many of the
problems with the specific exceptions in the Act could be alleviated by relatively minor amendments. One problem with the
168

Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § lOl(a)(l).
••• Id. § 101(b)(2)-(3).
110
With respect to arrest warrants, all that is required is that a "reasonably discreet
and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense
charged" and that the person named in the warrant committed the offense. Dumbra v.
United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925). Evidence that would justify conviction is not
required; all that is needed is a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). A similar standard applies to search warrants.
1 1
•
Several persons testifying before Congress said that the term "reason to believe"
means simply "mere suspicion on the part of law enforcement officers." See, e.g., House
Hearings, supra note 4, at 94 (testimony of Jerry Friedheim, Executive Vice-President,
American Newspaper Publishers Association). The term, however, is undefined by the
case law. See HousE REPORT, supra note 81, at 24-25 (supplemental views of Reps. Hyde,
Lungren, Sensenbrenner and Volkmer).
The problem with using "reason to believe as a standard is illustrated by the disagreement between House members over the meaning of the term. Supporters of Zurcher
legislation stated that the "reason to believe" standard "is higher than mere suspicion,
but ... is considerably less demanding than 'probable cause.'" Id. at 8. However, opponents of the legislation stated that the Act would raise the normal "probable cause"
standard "to require an additional 'reason to believe.' " Id. at 24. Because of this confusion, it is preferable to employ a standard such as "probable cause" which already enjoys
an established meaning. See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
••• See note 160 supra. This established meaning would provide "definitive legal
guidelines." House Hearings, supra note 4, at 90 (testimony of Charles Bailey, Editor,
Minneapolis Tribune, and Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors).
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statute, however, would require major rev1s1on: the distinction
between work product and documentary materials. This distinction is troubling for two reasons. First, the distinction does not
further the First Amendment interests which Zurcher legislation
was designed to protect, the rights of the press to gather and
disseminate information to the public. To safeguard these interests, supporters of Zurcher legislation sought to protect a reporter's confidential sources and to prevent the police from
blocking publication by removing materials from the newsroom. 168 Th--e distinction between work product and documentary materials does nothing to meet this goal. Documentary
materials are as likely as work product to contain information
that may compromise confidential sources if revealed to the
police. 1 " Likewise, documentary materials may be as essential as
work product to publication. 186 Therefore, no justification exists
based on the importance of these materials to First Amendment
processes for favoring work product over documentary
materials. 168
Second, the distinction is likely to cause severe problems of
proof for the police. Whether or not certain items are work product or documentary materials depends entirely on the subjective
intention of the party in possession to disclose the information
to the public. 187 As a practical matter, obtaining evidence of
such intent is impossible in the earier stages of investigations
when warrants normally are sought. 188 A final determination of
the nature of the items sought, therefore, could not be made un'" See pt. I B 2 supra.
'" For example, an internal newspaper memorandum detailing the identity of confidential sources for the purpose of determining their reliability, although a "documentary
material," see Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ 107(a), would not be considered
"work product" because the information was not created for public communication. See
id. § 107(b)(2). Such a memorandum, however, would be highly damaging to the persons
named if the police saw it.
11
" For example, the documents used as the basis for the Pentagon Papers case, although "documentary materials," would not have been considered "work product" because they were secret and therefore were not created for public disclosure. See id. If
these materials were removed before journalists had a chance to take notes on them, the
Pentagon Papers story could never have been published.
,.. There was no suggestion from journalists testifying before Congress that they
feared searches for work product more than those for documentary materials. In fact,
some commentators point out that newsrooms are unlikely to separate work product
from documentary materials, and that "any search that is conducted under the ... statute is likely to uncover both." House Hearings, supra note 4, at 45 (prepared statement
of John H. F. Shattuck, Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington Office).
117
See notes 126-30 and accompanying text supra.
118
See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 349 (prepared statement of Robert W.
Johnson, County Attorney of Anoka County, Minnesota).
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til after the search was executed and the party searched litigated
the question in court. To avoid this confusion, the distinction
should be abandoned and all items sought from third parties
should be subject to the same exceptions. Because the exceptions provided by the statute for documentary materials are reasonable accommodations of legitimate law enforcement interests,
these exceptions should also apply to work product rather than
limiting the exceptions for searches of documentary materials to
the two limited exceptions provided for work product.

C. Remedies for Violations
To enforce its provisions, Congress provided a civil cause of
action for damages stemming from violations of the Act. 169 The
drafters hoped to accomplish the dual purpose of compensating
victims of illegal searches for their injuries, and of deterring
future police illegality. 170 But a civil damage remedy, standing
alone, is unlikely to achieve either goal because such remedies
traditionally have proved ineffective in the search and seizure
context.
The statute provides that any person aggrieved 171 by a violation of the Act may institute a civil action for damages. 171 The
Act specifically grants the federal district courts subject matter
jurisdiction without the usual $10,000 amount-in-controversy
requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 173 This
waiver of the jurisdictional amount is desirable because of the
problems civil litigants encounter in trying to show more than
••• The Act provides that "[a] person aggrieved by a search for or seizure of materials
in violation of this Act shall have a civil cause of action for damages. . . ." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 106(a).
170
For example, the drafters noted that preventing governmental units from asserting
the "good faith" defense available under § 106(b) to individual officers would both provide a "fair means of assuring compensation for damages" and "enhance the deterrent
effect of the statute." SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 15.
171
The aggrieved party referred to in the statute is the party possessing the materials
illegally seized by the police. The drafters indicated that the Act is not intended to alter
rules of standing to bring an action for unlawful search and seizure. Because the purpose
of the statute is to protect innocent third parties in possession of documents and papers,
it is only these persons who may avail themselves of the remedies provided for in the
Act. Consequently, persons to whom the information relates - the criminal suspect would lack standing to bring suit for the claimed violation. Id. at 14.
171
See note 169 supra.
,.. The Act provides that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under this section." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 4, at § 106(h).
The drafters indicated that this provision was specifically designed to overcome the
$10,000 amount in controversy requirement of the federal rules. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 81, at 16.

SPRING

1981]

Privacy Protection Act

551

nominal damages for violations of civil rights laws. 174 The statute also provides that the aggrieved party may recover actual
damages sustained as a result of a violation. Where only nominal
damages can be shown, the plaintiff is entitled to recover liquidated damages of not less than $1,000. 1711 In addition, the court
in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees and other
litigation costs. 178
The problem with this remedial scheme is that civil litigants
in search and seizure cases often encounter considerable difficulty in identifying the extent of their injuries in money terms.
There often is little direct injury to the person or property of the
victim as a result of the search, and injury to reputation is difficult to quantify. 177 Although the statute does provide for liquidated damages of not less than $1,000, this is unlikely to provide
sufficient incentive for plaintiffs to sue. Violations of the Act,
therefore, are likely to go unremedied.
Even if the plaintiff is able to show substantial damages, other
obstacles remain to recovery. The statute permits the plaintiff to
proceed directly against the individual officer involved in the illegal search. 178 However, plaintiffs in search and seizure cases
are often unable to obtain favorable verdicts against individual
officers. The Act specifically provides the individual officer with
a "good faith" defense 178 which is difficult to overcome because
it requires a showing that the officer did not act reasonably in
carrying out the search. 180 In addition, plaintiffs in police mis"' See note 177 and accompanying text infra.
170
Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 106(f).
178
Id. The statute, however, prohibits the court from holding a governmental unit
liable for interest prior to judgment. Id.
177
See Gelles, supra note 114, at 693.
178
Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 106(a)(2).
11
• Id. § 106(b) ("It shall be a complete defense ... that the officer or employee had a
reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct.").
'"" See Project, supra note 114, at 803. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at
108-09 (testimony of John H.F. Shattuck, Director, American Civil Liberties Union,
Washington Office) ("good faith" defense requires plaintiff to show that the officer acted
with actual malice).
This is not to suggest, however, that the "good faith" defense be abandoned. If officers
do indeed have a reasonable "good faith" belief in the lawfulness of their conduct, they
should be protected because otherwise the police might hesitate to act in critical situations, thereby crippling effective law enforcement. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 429 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). The problem is that many juries misapply the defense by focusing on the subjective
good faith of the officer and ignoring the objective standard of reasonableness which the
defense requires. See Project, supra note 114, at 802-03. The defense thus makes ·it
doubly difficult for civil litigants to obtain a favorable judgment, which diminishes the
compensatory and deterrent function of the civil damage remedy. Because the "good
faith" defense makes sense, however, a different, complementary remedy to civil damage
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conduct cases face considerable hostility from juries traditionally sympathetic to law enforcement. 181 Finally, even if the
plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a favorable verdict, actual recovery is unlikely. Most policemen and other civil servants are
"judgment proor• because they are not paid enough to satisfy
large damage awards. 182 These problems make the civil damage
action against individual officers ineffective to accomplish either
the compensation or deterrence goal of the remedy.
The Act also provides that the plaintiff may proceed against
the governmental unit responsible for the offending officer.
Where a federal officer violates the statute, the aggrieved party
may sue the United States directly. 188 Where the action is
against a state officer or employee, however, the state can be
held responsible for damages resulting from the violation only if
it has waived its sovereign immunity.m If the state has not
waived its immunity, the plaintiff must proceed against the individual officer involved. 1811 By enabling. litigants to sue the governmental entity involved, Congress sought to provide a "deep
pocket" of funds to pay for any actual damages sustained.
Where the governmental unit is the United States government,
this "deep pocket" is readily available because the litigant can
sue the federal government without regard to whether or not it
has waived its sovereign immunity. 188 When the plaintiff attempts to hold a state or local government responsible, however,
the statute only permits suits when the governmental unit has
waived its sovereign immunity. Few states have waived their imrelief should be employed.
1 1
•
Juries generally are biased against plaintiffs in police misconduct suits because of
the image of authority and respectability projected by policemen, the "good faith" defense available to the defendant, and the plaintiff's reputation, race or lifestyle. See Project, supra note 114, at 783-84. See also Gelles, supra note 114, at 692-93; Note, "Damages or Nothing"-The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 667,
692 (1979); Note, Reviewing Civilian Complaints of Police Misconduct-Some Answers
and More Questions, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 89, 93 (1974).
181
See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 787 (1970); Gelles, supra note 114, at 694.
In many cases, of course, either the individual officer is insured or is indemnified by
the police department for any damages incurred as a result of an illegal search. See
Project, supra note 114, at 810-12. While this provides a source of funds for potential
litigants, it decreases the deterrent value of the civil damage remedy by insulating the
offending officer from personal liability for the misconduct. Id. at 814-15.
181
Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ 106(a)(l). The Act permits the Attorney
General to settle a claim for damages brought against the federal government. It also
requires that the Attorney General promulgate regulations for imposing administrative
sanctions against the offending officer. Id. § 106(g).
184
Id. § 106(a)(l). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 14.
,ea Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 106(a)(2).
188
Id. § 106(a)(l).
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munity from liability for the acts of their officials in other contexts, 187 and are unlikely to do so in the situation presented
here. The plaintiff, therefore, will in most cases have to look to
the individual officer for relief.
Several solutions to these problems are possible. First, to increase the likelihood that litigants will be able to reach an adequate source of funds to pay for damages, Congress should
amend the statute to permit direct suits against the state or local government responsible for the offending officer, regardless
of whether or not it has waived its sovereign immunity. 188 This
will insure that the officer's lack of resources will not deter potential plaintiffs from suing; it also will have the salutary effect
of encouraging state and local governments to exercise greater
supervision of police practices to minimize the risk of lawsuits. 189
Second, Congress should at least double the amount of liquidated damages that a successful plaintiff is sure to receive. The
current amount is slightly more than nominal, and increasing
the amount of liquidated damages would provide greater incentive for plaintiffs to sue. An increase would also make proof of
actual damages less significant. Finally, Congress should enhance the deterrent effect of the remedy. Because of the difficul:..
ties that civil litigants have in proving actual damages beyond
the liquidated amount, the police may find that it is worth paying a few thousand dollars to obtain crucial evidence from a
third party. Under the present scheme the police can "buy out"
the privacy rights proteced by the Act if they think that the
benefits of obtaining the evidence outweigh the cost. To prevent
this, Congress should first provide for punitive damages assessable against the individual officer in cases of particularly egregious conduct. 190 Punitive damages supplement compensatory
'"' For example, while some jurisdictions permit suits directly against the state for the
acts of state officials, see Herman v. State, 78 Misc. 2d 1025, 357 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Ct. Cl.
1974), most jurisdictions do not. See W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND
CONFESSIONS § 167.03 (Supp. 1978).
188
Congress may, under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorize direct suits
against the state for search and seizure violations. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976): "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits
against States. . . ." For a discussion of constitutional issues raised by the Privacy Protection Act, see pt. II D infra.
. '" See Project, supra note 114, at 817-18.
100
In the Senate version of the Act, violators were subject to "such punitive damages
as may be warranted." S. 1790, § 106(0, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in SENATE
REPoaT, supra note 81, at 3. The aggrieved party under this version was entitled to collect such damages either from the individual officer or the governmental unit responsible
for the officer. SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 14-15. However, municipalities should
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damages and insure that the police will not be able to "buy their
way out" of violations of the Act for less than substantial
sums. 191 In addition, Congress should provide that evidence obtained in violation of the statute cannot be used in any subsequent criminal proceeding. 192 This third-party exclusionary
rule-similar to the one now available in some circumstances to
criminal suspects-193 could be invoked by the aggrieved party
where there is a substantial, intentional violation of the Act. 1 "
This would remove the temptation to risk a minimal damage
award to obtain crucial evidence while at the same time insuring
that merely technical or "good faith" violations of the statute do
not result in the exclusion of valuable evidence. 1911 By supplenot ordinarily be liable for punitive damages unless they have affirmatively sanctioned
the egregious conduct of the individual officer. Cf. Monell v. New York City Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities can be held liable for violations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only if the deprivation of the plaintiff's
rights was caused by "official" policies or customs).
m Punitive damages ordinarily should be reserved for those occasions where the officer's conduct was intentional or malicious. Cf. Gelles, supra note 114, at 686 n.261 (discussing proposals to limit the exclusionary rule to "substantial violations").
1
"
The statute currently provides that "[e]vidence otherwise admissible in a proceeding shall not be excluded on the basis of a violation of this Act." Privacy Protection Act,
supra note 5, at § 106(e). The drafters recognized that the failure to provide for the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence could permit the government to deliberately violate
the Act so it can obtain evidence to be used against another party, but they said they
expected "that the Department of Justice and state and local Jaw enforcement authorities will not allow the provisions regarding exclusion of evidence . . . to be manipulated
in bad faith by their officers and agents." SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 15.
m The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence at the trial of a criminal suspect which was seized in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
194
Third parties currently Jack standing to invoke the exclusionary rule to exclude
evidence obtained in violation of their rights because the evidence is not being used
against them. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. at 130-32. Moreover, the suspected
criminal also may lack standing to invoke the rule for evidence seized in an illegal thirdparty search because normally his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Cf.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (co-defendants and co-conspirators cannot prevent evidence seized illegally from another defendant from being introduced
against them). Absent a specific provision in the statute, therefore, evidence seized illegally from third parties could rarely be excluded by reliance on the exclusionary rule.
Although they specifically rejected a third-party exclusionary rule for the statute, ,ee
note 192 supra, the drafters were concerned that standing requirements for assertion of
the exclusionary rule could become "a sword to be used by the government to permit it
deliberately to invade one person's Fourth Amendment right in order to obtain evidence
against another person." SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 15, (quoting United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 738 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
186
This is the same standard as that suggested for deciding whether or not to award
punitive damages, except that the judge or magistrate should consider the public interest
in obtaining evidence for the prosecution of serious crimes when deciding whether the
rule should apply. See note 190 supra. See also S. 881, 93rd Cong., 1st Seu. (1973)
("Evidence shall not be excluded ... unless the court finds, as a matter of law, that such
violation was substantial").
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menting the civil damage remedy in these ways, Congress can
provide greater assurance that the statute will not be violated
and that victims of illegal searches will be compensated for their
injuries. 196
The reason for limiting the third-party exclusionary rule to those 11ituations where the
violation was "substantial" is that commentators have questioned the continued application of the exclusionary rule to all illegal searches. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Spiotto, The Search and
Seizure Problem-The Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J.
POLICE Sci. & AD. 36 (1973). Several Supreme Court justices also have criticized the rule
when applied to situations involving "good faith" violations. See California v. Minjares,
443 U.S. 916 (1979) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
415-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Despite these criticisms, many commentators
believe that effective alternatives to the rule do not exist. See Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Kv. L.J. 681 (1974); Gelles, supra note 114, at 689-720. See also Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) ("other remedies have been worthless and futile" in deterring
illegal police searches).
Because the exclusionary rule ordinarily is not available to third parties, see note 194
and accompanying text supra, a statutory third-party exclusionary rule would greatly
expand the situations where the rule would apply. This extension of the rule should not
occur at a time when its continued efficacy is increasingly questioned without some limitations. A "substantial violation" test, while not wholly satisfactory because it is somewhat subjective, see Gelles, supra note 114, at 706-09, would provide some limits while at
the same time insuring that the rule is available for extreme violations of the Act.
For the same reasons, only the third party whose rights were violated should be permitted to invoke the statutory exclusionary rule. To permit the party to whom the
materials relate-that is, the suspected criminal-to invoke the rule would unjustifiably
broaden its scope and would provide the criminal with a "windfall" when the criminal's
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the search.
,.. Aside from the civil damage remedy and the exclusionary rule discussed supra,
three other possible remedies exist. The first is a criminal sanction. See, e.g., S. 3222,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (up to one year imprisonment for violations). The problem
with this remedy is that it requires prosecutors to institute a criminal action against
persons with whom they work closely every day. See Gelles, supra note 114, at 713-14;
Note, Reviewing Civilian Complaints, supra note 181, at 93-94.
The two other possibilities are injunctive and declaratory relief. See, e.g., H.R. 322,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (court shall award "such relief as may be appropriate, including ... equitable or declaratory relier'). These remedies, however, generally are regarded as ineffective to correct or prevent illegal police searches. See Gelles, supra note
114, at 715-17; Note, Reviewing Civilian Complaints, supra note 181, at 94-97. But see
Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78
YALB L.J. 143 (1968) (federal injunction effective in certain circumstances).
Of course, the ineffectiveness of such remedies does not mean they should not be provided for in the statute. The more avenues a potential litigant has open, the more likely
the statute will be enforced. See, e.g., H.R. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which provides a combination of remedies, including general damages, equitable and declaratory
relief, punitive damages up to $100,000, costs and attorney's fees, plus a third-party exclusionary rule.
Regardless of what additional remedies Congress provides, it should include a specific
provision establishing a statute of limitations for actions under the Act. The Act currently is silent on the time limit for bringing suit against violators, and this could prove
to be a problem. In general, where a federal statute is silent on the question, the statute

556

Journal of Law Reform

D.

[VOL. 14:3

Constitutional Basis for the Act

The Privacy Protection Act imposes a federal "subpoena first"
rule on all levels of government - federal, state and local. 197
This uniform application of the statute is desirable because otherwise residents of a state that has enacted Zurcher legislation
would be protected from unrestricted third-party searches while
residents of a neighboring state that has failed to enact such legislation would not. 198 Such disparity of treatment is intolerable
where federal constitutional rights are at stake, particulary when
most third-party searches are likely to occur at the state and
local level. 199 A key concern of supporters of a uniform federal
response, however, has been whether Congress has exceeded its
constitutional authority by restricting search and seizure at the
state and local level. 200 The statute relies on Congress, power to
regulate interstate commerce as authority for imposing a federal
"subpoena first,, rule on the states. 201 Under the commerce
of limitations of the particular state where the violation occurred applies. Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976) (§ 1981 suits); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (§ 1981); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05
(1960) (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461,
463-64 (1947); McC!aine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905). Having different statutes of
limitations apply in different states, however, is undesirable because the purpose of the
Privacy Protection Act is to provide a uniform federal rule applicable equally in all
states; it also may create problems when searches are conducted by police from different
jurisdictions. To avoid this result, Congress should specifically provide a statute of limitations in the Act. See, e.g., H.R. 322, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) ("A person aggrieved
by a violation . . . may bring an action . . . no later than three years after such violation
is committed, or one year after such violation is discovered, whichever is later.").
,., SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 9.
'" At least eight states have passed legislation restricting third-party searches. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524 (West Supp. 1980); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-33a (1979); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, § 108-3 (1979); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1979-80); OR. REv. STAT. § 44.520 (Supp. 1979); TBX. CRIM.
PRo. STAT. ANN. § 18.0l(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. § 968.13 (1979). The great
majority, however, have not.
'" For example, all instances of newsroom searches since 1970 have occurred at the
state or local level. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 43-46 (prepared statement of
Philip Heymann, Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General). See also the testimony of
Anthony Day, Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, American Society of
Newspaper Editors, id. at 128 ("It is the States and not the Federal Government from
which we expect most of our problems").
100
See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 335-42 (memorandum from Mitchell Arnold,
Communications Law Clinic of New York Law School). The only real dispute is whether
Congress can impose a federal criminal procedure rule on state officials; Congress clearly
has jurisdiction to regulate federal criminal procedure under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3771
(1976). Id. at 336.
101
The statute's protections are limited to persons involved in activities "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at§ 101. The
drafters relied on the commerce clause "because disseminating information regularly af-
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clause,101 Congress has wide latitude in defining when certain
intrastate activities unnecessarily burden interstate .commerce,
and in fashioning an appropriate remedy to remove the burden.103 However, there are two problems with relying on the
commerce clause. First, the Supreme Court recently has attempted to cut back on Congress' power to regulate purely intrastate activities through the commerce power by ·interposing an
independent state autonomy barrier to federal legislation that
operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional government functions. " 104 The extent of this limitation is unclear,soe1 but it casts
doubt on the authority of Congress by virtue of its commerce
power to impose a federal "subpoena first" rule on the states.
More importantly, the commerce clause only reaches those subjects that can arguably be characterized as affecting interstate
commerce. This includes "even activity that is purely intrastate
in character ... where that activity, combined with like conduct
by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the
states."106 But the reach of this power is not unlimited; certain
purely intrastate matters are insulated from Congress' commerce
power. 107 The statute as it reads now only affects persons involved in the dissemination of information "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. "108 Because most forms of public
communication are considered interstate commerce,so9 relian~e
fects interstate commerce." SENATE REPoRT, supra note 81, at 9.
•as U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. this constitutional provision grant.a Congress the
power to "regulate commerce ... among the several states."
00
• Coupled with the necessary and proper clause, art. I., § 8, cl. 18, the commerce
clause empowers Congress to regulate even those activities occurring entirely within one
state if these activities "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or obstructions. . . . " NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
"°' National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). In National League of
Cities, the Court held that congressional attempt.a to prescribe minimum wages and
maximum hours to be paid state employees were unconstitutional because they impaired
the ability of the states to "function effectively in a federal system." Id. (quoting Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). The Court said that "there are limit.a upon
the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising it.a otherwise
plenary powers ... to regulate commerce . . . . " 426 U.S. at 842.
- See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 61-69, 338-39 (statement of Mark Tuchnet,
law professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; and memorandum from Mitchell
Arnold, Communications Law Clinic of New York Law School).
108
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
007
See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 366 (testimony of Paul Bender, professor of
law, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
- Privacy Protection Act, supra note 5, at § 101.
- See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128-29 (1937) ("Interstate communi-
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on the commerce power is justified. If, however, the statute is
expanded to cover all third parties, whether or not they are involved in information dissemination,210 then reliance on the
commerce clause would be inadequate. Because of the potentially large class of people affected by the statute, it is unlikely
that all of them are involved in activities "affecting commerce
among the states. " 211 It would unduly complicate warrant proceedings to require a case-by-case determination that a particular third party is involved in interstate commerce, and the refore
an alternative source of congressional power should be relied on
if the statute is amended to encompass all third parties.
Although commentators have suggested other sources,212 the
Fourteenth Amendment is the source of congressional power
which is best suited to insuring that all third parties can be protected by the statute. 213 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is a grant of federal power over the states equal to that of the
necessary and proper clause. 214 The Supreme Court, however,
has been more willing to sanction direct congressional incursions
into areas of state autonomy under section 5 than under other
grants of federal power such as the commerce clause because the
Fourteenth Amendment is expressly directed at the states.n 11 As
cation of a business nature, whatever the means of such communication, is interstate
commerce regulable by Congress. . . . ").
11
• See pt. II A supra.
11
•
Professionals such as lawyers and doctors unquestionably are involved in interstate
commerce and could be protected under the commerce clause. However, it is questionable whether the commerce power reaches all third parties. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 3, at 366 (testimony of Paul Bender, law professor, University of Pennsylvania Law
School) .
.,. For example, some have suggested that Congress could require that the states
adopt a "subpoena first" rule as a condition to receiving federal grants. Id. at 375.
118
The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part:
Section 1. . . . No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
m Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). See also Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879), where the Court explained the broad reach of§ 5:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality
of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against state denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of Congressional power.
m Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (commerce power
limited by reserved powers of the states), with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)
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a result, the Court has permitted Congress to adopt broad remedial measures under section 5 to effectuate the objectives of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 216
In the context of third-party sea;ches, a strong argument exists that Congress can restrict state and local police under its
section 5 remedial powers. As previously noted, 217 unrestricted
third-party searches pose significant dangers to both First and
Fourth Amendment rights even when those searches are lawful.
· In addition, these dangers are most likely to arise at the state
level. 218 Because both First and Fourth Amendment rights are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from state encroachment, 219 Congress is empowered to employ broad remedial measures to protect these rights from infringement. Congress, therefore, could determine that unrestricted third-party searches at
the state level threaten First and Fourth Amendment rights, 220
and that a federal "subpoena first" rule is necessary to minimize
that threat. In effect, Congress would be using the federal "subpoena first" rule as a prophylactic device to mitigate the dangers
posed by third-party searches. 221 Most comentators agree that
(power of Congress under Fourteenth Amendment not limited by reserved powers of the
states). See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (Fifteenth Amendment); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 345-48 (1879).
118
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), where the Court upheld a
congressional ban on state literacy tests as a prophylactic device to insure that a certain
segment of the population was not denied the right to vote. See also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), where the Court construed the enforcement clause of
the Fifteenth Amendment, which is essentially identical to§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as permitting Congress to fashion specific remedies for enforcing the prohibitions
of that amendment.
117
See pts. I B 1-2 supra.
11
• See note 199 and accompanying text supra.
11
• Both the First and Fourth Amendments are among the "fundamental personal
rights and liberties" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Fourth
Amendment); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (First Amendment); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (First Amendment).
110
The courts are unlikely to question such a finding. Traditionally, the courts have
accorded Congress a presumption that facts necessary to support the constitutionality of
legislation exist. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1876) ("if a state of facts could
exist that would justify such legislation, it actually did exist when the statute under
consideration was passed"). The reason for this presumption is the legislature's superior
factfinding abilities. See generally Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 CINN. L. REv. 199, 208-09 (1971).
111
See note 216 and accompanying text supra. Of course, Zurcher specifically held
that the Constitution does not require a "subpoena first" rule. This should not, however,
prove an obstacle to congressional action because the Court in other contexts has permitted Congress under § 5 to restrict or outlaw state practices which the Court previously
had found constitutional. For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966),
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a congressional ban on literacy tests for voting
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Congress has ample authority under section 5 to impose a federal "subpoena first" rule on both state and federal law enforcement officials. 222
CONCLUSION

In Zurcher, the Supreme Court invited legislative action to
provide nonconstitutional protections against unrestricted thirdparty searches. 228 Congress responded to this invitation with the
Privacy Protection Act. This response is an admirable first step
even though the Court previously had declared such tests constitutional. The Court said
that
a construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that enforcement of a state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the
Amendment.
Id. at 648. Congress can therefore restrict third-party searches even though the Court
has declared such searches constitutional.
... See House Hearings, supra note 4, at 339-42 (memorandum of Mitchell Arnold,
Communications Law Clinic, New York Law School); Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at
365-79 (testimony of Paul Bender, law professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
and William Cohen, law professor, Stanford University Law School).
The Court recently has attempted to set limits on congressional power under § 5, but
the extent of these limitations is unclear. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a
sharply divided Court (five Justices wrote separate opinions) invalidated that portion of
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which lowered the minimum voting age in
state elections from 21 to 18 as an unconstitutional assertion of congressional power
under§ 5. The fragmented nature of the opinion, however, negates much of its force as
precedent. See Cox, supra note 220, at 223-39 (Mitchell an "eclectic" ruling that does
not signal a significant restriction on congressional power under § 5). See also Cohen,

Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv.
603, 617-18 "(1974).

More importantly, Zurcher is distinguishable from Mitchell. In Mitchell, the congressional legislation conflicted with a specific constitutional provision,· art. I, § 2, which gives
the states the power to set qualifications for voting in state elections. In Zurcher, however, only the more nebulous reserved powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment
block the assertion of congressional authority, and it was these reserved powers that were
significantly reduced by the Fourteenth Amendment. See note 215 and accompanying
text supra. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 112 (testimony of John H.F.
Shattuck, Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington Office).
In addition, the Justices in Mitchell were unanimous in upholding the power of Congress to suspend otherwise lawful literacy tests as a means of eliminating the threat of
racial discrimination in voting. This is further support for the theory that Congress could
adopt a "subpoena first" rule as a prophylactic device designed to prevent police abuses
in the context of third-party searches. See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 376-77
(testimony of William Cohen, law professor, Stanford University Law School).
11
• The Court said, "Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise
against legislative or executive efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections against
possible abuses of the search warrant procedures. . . . " Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. at 567.
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in dealing with the concerns Zurcher raised. Although the governmental interest in effective law enforcement is fundamental
and must be preserved, that interest should be effectuated by
the least intrusive means possible to insure against inadvertent
infringement of important personal rights and liberties. 214 The
federal "subpoena first" rule adopted by Congress represents a
reasonable accommodation of law enforcement interests and individual rights. It should be lauded for its attempt to balance
these two important but sometimes conflicting interests.
The congressional response to Zurcher, however, is incomplete. Although the Act safeguards the First Amendment rights
of the press and others involved in information dissemination, it
leaves the general public's right to privacy virtually unprotected.
This right to privacy is a fundamental right22' of equal stature
with the First Amendment rights of the press; as such, it must
be protected "not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but
also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference. "228 Congress should re-examine the issue of third-party
searches and complete the task it began with passage of the Privacy Protection Act.

-Jose M. Sariego

11
• In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized a "less drastic means" doctrine in First
Amendment cases. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("Even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved."). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); NMCP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); see generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
116
See note 219 supra. AB the Supreme Court itself has recognized: "The security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 45 (1949).
11
• Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).

